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 Rural Credit Markets and Aggregate
 Shocks: The Experience of Nuits
 St. Georges, 1 756-1 776
 JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL
 Using a complete enumeration of credit contracts for a rural area in Burgundy,
 this article examines how credit markets functioned and what role they served.
 Credit markets distributed funds to a large fraction of the population, and they
 were organized to mediate problems of asymmetric information. A central
 constraint on credit markets, however, was the threat of government intervention.
 Because of this threat, capital markets remained relatively isolated from one
 another.
 For decades historians have either ignored or bad-mouthed rural
 credit in preindustrial Europe. Some have assumed that there was
 no rural credit worthy of study before the late nineteenth-century arrival
 of banks. Others have viewed debt as merely a mechanism whereby
 peasants lost their property. In recent years a different view has
 emerged based on new empirical research. Economists and historians
 alike are discovering vibrant rural credit systems from southern Italy to
 northeastern Germany.' All these credit systems have in common that
 they relied, in part at least, on notaries who recorded and kept copies of
 private contracts. Thus much data on credit activity survives. This
 article reports on work in progress on the credit system of a small town
 in Burgundy well known by oenophiles: Nuits St. Georges.
 Three decades ago Pierre de Saint Jacob published his these d'etat on
 the peasants of Burgundy.2 Among French social historians studying
 the countryside, he alone paid close attention to credit. Relying on
 limited data, however, he was unable to establish much of a link
 between the financial system and the real economy. Using a complete
 enumeration of credit contracts from 1757 through 1776, I propose to
 reassess the importance of rural credit. I begin by describing the area's
 economy and the types of credit transactions that we can observe. I then
 turn to three issues: How was the credit market organized? How
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 1 Fontaine, "Espace"; Winnige, "Credit"; Dellile, "Le trop"; and Servais, La rente.
 2 Saint-Jacob, Les paysans.
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 broadly were funds distributed? How well did the credit system
 overcome aggregate changes in the economy?
 AN ECONOMIC SUMMARY
 By 1750, the Cote d'Or, Burgundy's premier winegrowing region, had
 already achieved considerable economic growth. Although high quality
 white wines are produced further to the north, the Cote de Nuits marks
 the limit of premium red wine production. Only a small proportion of the
 available land, however, can bear vines-the Cote, the steep, east-
 facing slope of the Saone valley. Turning part of this slope into a
 vineyard typically involved considerable outlays of capital, as it was
 necessary to terrace the land. As a consequence, in Burgundy, unlike in
 the Bordelais or other regions, it was difficult to adjust wine acreage to
 demand. Thus it may not be entirely surprising that vineyards in Nuits
 specialized in producing high-quality wines whose demand would
 presumably be more stable.
 Geography seems to have determined much of the organization of
 economic activity in the area. To the east of the Cote, rises a series of
 hills, cut by deep valleys that were principally covered by forest and
 pasture in the eighteenth century. To the west of the Cote, the terrain
 becomes increasingly wet as one nears the Saone river, and the grain
 fields that adjoined the vineyards during this period gave way more and
 more to woodlands. In a space less than 20 miles across, there were
 three distinct economic areas: the hills, the poorest area, dedicated to
 livestock and wood-related activities; the Cote, where wine predomi-
 nated; and the plains, where grain growing reigned supreme. The
 different specializations of these three areas made complementary
 demands on local labor supplies. Because wheat is harvested nearly a
 month before grapes must be cut, the same temporary labor forces can
 be used for both. The intensive wheat farms and the vineyards drew
 labor both from the hills and from the textile industry. Indeed putting-
 out, that familiar sideline of intensive agriculture, was widespread in the
 larger villages.3 The spatial segmentation of agriculture also implies that
 individual farmers were probably far more specialized in the Cote de
 Nuits region than elsewhere and therefore more at risk in case a specific
 crop-grapes or grain-failed.
 The complex spatial distribution of economic activity was matched by
 an intricate organization of production. Throughout the region landown-
 ership was highly concentrated, and most farmers were tenants of
 nobles or of the church. In the grain-growing areas large farms predom-
 inated, whereas in the winegrowing areas tenancies were rather small.
 Few grape growers could afford the equipment necessary for winemak-
 3 Much of this general information can be gleaned from the occupational distribution on the tax
 list (rolles de tailles, Archives Departementales de la C6te d'Or [hereafter AD Cote d'Or], serie C).
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 ing, so most of them sold their crop to vintners. Wine merchants based
 in Nuits, Dijon, and Beaune bought significant amounts of wine to ship
 to Paris and Rouen for international export.
 Nuits St. Georges's economic characteristics provide no clear indi-
 cation of the extent of credit activity relative to other areas of similar
 size. On the one hand, extensive commercialization and specialization
 should have increased the demand for financial services. On the other,
 concentrated land ownership should have decreased it. In the absence
 of aggregate data, any conclusions about representativeness will have to
 wait until more of these markets have been studied systematically.
 CREDIT ACTIVITY
 At the beginning of the eighteenth century the crown instituted a tax
 on notarial contracts and all other private contracts that were part of
 legal procedures.4 This tax was disguised as a registration and authen-
 tication process called the controle des actes. The scribe of the controle
 entered summary information about the contract next to the tax
 payment. Louis Lebon, Nuits's controller during the period, was
 neither compulsive (like a few) nor sloppy (like many). He nearly always
 took down the name of individuals and their residence and profession.
 In the case of debts, he also recorded the amount of money at stake and
 the date that the agreement was signed. He did not find it desirable,
 however, to include information about collateral, purpose, or duration.
 Before describing the data set further we must briefly discuss what
 kinds of credit contracts were registered in Nuits. If the contractors
 made use of a notary, prompt registration was mandatory. If, however,
 the parties conducted their transactions on their own, registration was
 optional unless the contract became part of a legal process. Thus the
 private contracts that I enumerated are a subsample of all private
 agreements. Four types of credit transactions appear in the registers:
 rentes (perpetual or life annuities) and obligations (medium-term con-
 tracts), notes, and debt transfers (cessions).5 Rentes and obligations
 were always notarized, whereas notes were always private agreements.
 One finds both short-term notes (billets) and long-term contracts (billets
 rentuels) in the record.6 Long-term notes were quite rare, and appear to
 be unique to Burgundy. The final category of contracts, transfers, is the
 most heterogeneous of all. Transfers were common for both notarized
 4 In France most private contracts were drawn by notaries, semipublic officials who drew up and
 retained copies of private agreements.
 s In Nuits, rentes were overwhelmingly perpetuals; of 554 rentes, only 11 were life annuities.
 6 Short-term notes also include a few letters of exchange, but the bulk of private agreements were
 simply billets.
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 and non-notarized agreements and could happen either privately or
 before a notary.
 The data include slightly more than 8, 100 contracts from the registers
 of the controle.8 For each notarized contract, I recorded the names,
 occupations, sex, and residences of all parties, as well as the name of
 the notary, size of loan, date, and type of contract. For each registered
 note, I collected the same information plus the date on which the note
 was signed. Although all this information was almost always recovered
 for notarized contracts, note contracts frequently provided only the last
 name, the first letter of the first name, and residence of one of the
 parties. However, it was possible to complete the missing data in a large
 number of cases because most notes were signed by a few merchants in
 Nuits.9
 The fact that not all credit contracts were registered forces us to
 confront the question of sample selection squarely. The problem is most
 obvious in the case of notes, and at present we cannot use the sample to
 reconstruct levels of note activity. The notes in the sample can still be
 used to understand how the note and notarial markets interconnected.
 Nonetheless, we must view the results of this analysis as tentative. A
 second and related problem results from the coexistence of multiple
 credit markets that we observe with unequal accuracy, making inter-
 pretation of the total volumes of credit and the determinants of contract
 choice difficult. This problem extends beyond the boundaries of the
 registration process because there were at least two other capital
 transfer systems that were rarely registered as credit contracts: book
 credit with merchants and intrafamily capital transfers. Even within the
 notarial system, the links between obligations and rentes remain un-
 clear.
 As Table 1 shows, farmers were predominantly borrowers, and they
 carried out more than 80 percent of their notarial loans via obligations.
 Every other category was overrepresented both as borrowers and as
 lenders in terms of their share of the population. 1" Merchants were the
 only social group other than farmers to evidence a strong preference for
 7 Cessions really involved three parties: the debtor, the original creditor, and the new creditor.
 Because the debtor's contractual position did not change, I concentrate on the two creditors
 between whom the capital was being transferred at the time of the cession.
 8 AD C6te d'Or, serie C, 9,844-9,872. These include all registered contracts for the baillage of
 Nuits, a judicial and administrative territorial unit that comprised the town and two dozen
 surrounding villages. The data collection process is ongoing and will cover 1750 through 1780.
 9 It was more difficult to identify note borrowers than note lenders, because the borrowers simply
 signed the note, whereas the controller knew more about the lender who registered it. My
 identification procedure was extremely conservative in that notes were assigned to a particular
 individual only if there was only one possible match. Examination of judicial records, however,
 suggests that notes were mostly issued by merchants both to buy-as debtors-or to sell goods-as
 creditors.
 10 The tax roles understate the size of the agricultural population because only half the small
 villages have been enumerated and they contained almost exclusively farmers.
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 TABLE 1
 CONTRACT CHOICE BY SOCIAL GROUP AND TYPE OF CONTRACTa
 (percentages)
 Notes
 Numbers Value Obligations Rentes Cessions Taxpayers
 Occupations (N) (V) N V N V N V 1760b
 Borrowers
 Unknown 60.2 40.1 9.4 9.3 9.3 17.7 17.7 13.7 152
 Agriculture 19.1 11.1 74.5 66.6 56.0 28.9 28.9 17.7 1,646
 Artisans 4.6 5.0 7.2 6.7 13.1 11.1 11.0 10.2 328
 Merchants 8.3 18.1 7.6 13.9 14.2 23.2 23.2 35.7 112
 Professions 3.3 11.5 0.9 2.5 4.0 11.5 11.5 12.4 70
 Notaries 1.6 7.5 0.1 0.1 1.6 5.2 5.2 2.3 11
 Clergy 1.8 6.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.5 2.9 n.ac
 Nobles 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 5.1 n.ac
 Lenders
 Unknown 38.2 35.6 10.9 14.6 16.1 17.2 17.2 10.1
 Agriculture 7.1 4.8 22.2 18.2 34.0 18.9 19.0 8.9
 Artisans 4.2 7.1 4.6 4.7 8.4 5.4 5.4 7.1
 Merchants 27.0 29.2 40.6 40.6 21 26.6 26.7 47.6
 Professions 6.5 9.4 7.3 7.6 6.3 10.5 10.5 11.4
 Notaries 13.0 6.3 7.7 4.3 3.0 6.4 6.4 3.3
 Clergy 3.1 9.9 1.5 1.7 4.4 5.9 5.9 6.5
 Nobles 1.6 2.7 5.1 8.1 7.5 8.7 8.7 4.8
 Totals
 Contracts 2,619 4,545 572 373
 Volume 362,000 554,000 294,000 202,000
 a The group shares are reported as percentages of total activity, either number of contracts or
 volume in livres. In the last line, volume is reported in livres.
 b The population data are from an incomplete list of taxpayers for 1760 that includes Nuits and 48
 of 83 villages in the area.
 c Nobles and the clergy were exempt from the taille and thus do not appear on the rolles.
 Source: See the text.
 a certain type of contract (in this case notes). Cessions were equal to
 one-sixth the annual volume of lending in a market whose stock of
 outstanding debt could hardly have been more than five or six times
 larger. Indeed, obligations and notes were outstanding for less than a
 year on average and rentes for about 20 years before being repaid.
 Credit contracts may thus appear rather illiquid, as transfers amounted
 to only one-thirtieth of the volume of outstanding debts. The median
 size of cessions, however, was twice that of obligations or notes,
 suggesting that the secondary market was restricted to larger and
 longer-term debts (see Table 2). Given the relatively short duration of
 notes and obligations, an individual who wanted to rearrange his
 portfolio simply let such outstanding loans come due. For longer debts,
 especially rentes, in which the lender did not control duration, some sort
 of a secondary market was far more important, and the evidence
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 TABLE 2
 SUMMARY DATA BY TYPE OF CONTRACT
 Data Notes Obligations Rentes Cessions
 Numbers 2,619 4,545 572 373
 Mean (livres) 146 122 516 542
 Median (livres) 61 65 250 120
 Standard deviation 439 249 902 106
 Duration (years) 0.5 1 20
 Source: See the text.
 suggests that its activity was non-negligible because cessions were
 roughly equivalent to the annual volume of rentes.
 Over the entire period, obligations were small in size, averaging about
 four months' wages for a skilled worker.11 Notes were only slightly
 larger (averaging 146 livres compared with 122), but as we shall see, the
 two instruments served distinct purposes. Rentes were almost five times
 bigger than these other contracts, which is hardly surprising since
 borrowers in that market faced the additional transaction cost of
 collateralizing land. Because of their larger size, rentes amounted to
 more than a third of notarized credit, even though they were only 10
 percent of contracts. The small size and short duration of most contracts
 imply that the fixed costs of contracting were an important component
 of total borrowing costs. The significant differences in social composi-
 tion between borrowers and lenders suggests that the market found a
 way to reduce these contracting costs. Indeed, unlike the highly
 bilateral credit markets found elsewhere, loan contracting in Nuits St.
 Georges was heavily intermediated.
 Two groups dominated the provision of credit: merchants and nota-
 ries. Together they intermediated most of the loans, although they
 accounted for less than 3 percent of the population. These two groups
 carried out their business in rather different fashions. 12 Merchants were
 the creditors in about 40 percent of all loans made in Nuits. They
 borrowed money either in Dijon or Beaune via the note market, or
 long-term in Nuits or elsewhere via rentes. They then lent the proceeds
 to farmers. Notaries shied away from direct intermediation (their own
 loans amounted only to 4.7 percent of total loans), acting instead as
 brokers by matching potential lenders and borrowers in what remained
 bilateral contracts. They also provided information services to local
 seigniors, clerical institutions, and private parties, effectively managing
 their land and financial portfolios. Notarial intermediation thus
 " Contract size in Nuits appears to have been smaller than elsewhere. Compare Rosenthal,
 "Credit Markets"; and Hoffman et al., "Economie et politique."
 12 Intermediation by merchants is well captured by the data collected because many merchants
 both borrowed and lent extensively. Notaries are more elusive and their intermediation must be
 inferred from client loyalty rates and more qualitative sources. See for instance Hoffman et al.,
 "What Do Notaries Do?"
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 amounted to several times the volume of their direct loans.'3 The two
 networks were not fully separate as merchants borrowed and sometimes
 lent via rentes, whereas notaries often issued notes to their clients and
 sometimes borrowed without notarizing their contracts.
 Because merchant and notarial lending faced different constraints,
 they could compete indefinitely without one driving the other out of
 business. The merchant system may appear superior because loans
 were pooled across a large number of borrowers. Merchants, however,
 were engaged in the tricky business of matching heterogeneous financial
 assets because most of their funds came from short-term notes and they
 lent in the longer-term obligation market. Because the note market was
 the mechanism behind regional movements of private capital and public
 finance, it was at the mercy of both commercial crises and government
 defaults. Credit contractions were particularly taxing for merchants
 because their creditors had an incentive to try to shield themselves by
 calling in all their notes whenever a credit crisis threatened. One
 example of the merchants' exposure to credit contractions occurred in
 1770. The government defaulted on its short-term debt, triggering a
 series of financial crises throughout France that affected merchants
 from Marseilles in the south to Lille in the north.'4 In Nuits, the 1770
 crisis caused the downfall of Antoine Lacoste, who had long been the
 most successful merchant lender, accounting for about 12 percent of all
 obligation loans in previous years. In 1770 his creditors called in their
 funds, but because his debtors were not obligated to repay on demand,
 there was little Lacoste could do. Lacoste never recovered his financial
 preeminence, although he continued to operate both as a merchant and
 as a small-scale lender.
 The notarial credit system was obviously shielded from these prob-
 lems because nearly all contracts were bilateral-that is, notaries had no
 financial stake in the contracts they brokered. Moreover, the lesser
 importance of interregional flows in their activity insulated notaries
 from financial crises.'5 The problem for notaries was that they only
 brokered transactions. In such agreements investors bear all the risks
 from the loans they make. The lack of risk pooling required notaries to
 match borrowers and lenders far more carefully than merchants who
 offered a diversified portfolio. Although notaries did serve some large
 clients, most of their lenders had few loans in their portfolios and were
 probably not willing to bear much risk on any given contract. Thus the
 13 Nobles tended to be loyal to notaries who not only brokered their loans but also recorded their
 land leases and transcribed the verdicts of the seigniorial court.
 14 Vardi, Land, chap. 10; Carriere, Banque; Moulinas, Les juifs, pp. 341-57; and Chaussinand-
 Nogaret, Les financiers.
 iS Nonlocal participants were about 10 percent of the identified note participants and only 4
 percent of either rente or obligation participants.
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 riskier clients of the merchant credit system simply could not be served
 by notaries.
 The small average size of most types of loans, and their much smaller
 median size, suggest something of the purpose of the vast majority of
 these credit agreements. Most loans could hardly have been negotiated
 for major real estate acquisitions or improvements, nor were they the
 kind of debts that might have resulted from a month's worth of
 purchases at a baker's.'6 Rather these contracts were of a size and
 duration that might be required for working capital, to purchase
 livestock, seed, tools, and the like. They were also of a size that could
 result from settling long-running accounts in a merchant's book. 7 The
 magnitude of such borrowing may have been affected by economic
 fluctuations, but the link is not straightforward. In bad years people may
 have borrowed to smooth consumption or to replenish working capital.
 Conversely, credit activity may have increased in good times, if
 individuals borrowed primarily to finance marginal improvements to
 their land.
 A further clue to the functioning of the credit market comes from
 evidence about participation. The 4,000 or so taxpaying households of
 the region of Nuits St. Georges notarized about 300 credit contracts
 annually. Adding to that total the 130 notes that were signed each year,
 and ignoring the substantial fraction that was never registered, gives a
 total of 430 contracts per year for the Nuits credit system. If contracts
 had been evenly distributed in the population across all types of loans,
 then nearly 11 percent of the population would have borrowed in a given
 year, and the same proportion lent. Yet credit was not evenly spread
 out, either by type of contract or by group. To assess participation given
 the data at hand requires a set of assumptions about household turnover
 (because of mobility in and out of the area, and because of marriages
 and deaths) and a method for matching individuals as they reappear in
 the registers of the controle. On the demographic side we will assume
 that turnover over 20 years was 50 percent, so that the total number of
 families at risk of borrowing over the whole period was about 6,000.18
 The matching problem is complicated by the presence of fathers and
 sons who bore the same names and by the many individuals who
 changed occupation or residence over the course of two decades. For
 instance, by examining the tax rolles we can discover that Louis Gros
 16 Farmers were more likely to turn to rentes for such loans. Farmers received more than half the
 loans and a third of the capital of the rente market.
 17 See merchants defaults in AD C6te d'Or, serie B (baillage de Nuits) for purposes of obligation
 loans.
 18 A 50 percent turnover over 20 years is consistent with the data being extracted from tax rolles,
 which indicate a great deal of turnover in households. However, some of the households that left
 one village moved nearby. A 50 percent turnover is also consistent with a life expectancy at age 20
 of about 36 years, which would imply a turnover of about 54 percent per twenty-year period. For
 life expectancy, see Dupaquier, Histoire de la population, p. 100.
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 TABLE 3
 CREDIT ACTIVITY INDICATORS
 A. Participation Indicatorsa
 Individual
 Individual Individual Borrows
 Number of Only Only and
 Definition of Individual Individuals Borrows Lends Lends
 Same first and last name 4,978 2,398 1,868 712
 Same occupation, first and last name 6,227 3,066 2,437 724
 Same residence, first, and last name 6,623 3,444 1,819 360
 Same residence, occupation, first 7,009 3,595 2,8% 518
 and last name
 B. Repeat Activityb
 All Individuals Distant Participants
 Both Both
 Only Only Borrows Only Only Borrows
 Loans Borrows Lends and Lends Borrows Lends and Lends
 Average number of loans 3.5 6.1 8 2.7 4.2 3.9
 Median 3 3 5 2 3 3
 Standard deviation 2.7 12 25 1 5.3 4
 Maximum 31 32 504 5 35 15
 Individuals 831 735 510 9 65 15
 a All types of contracts were included in the table.
 b Individuals were required to have the same residence and first and last name.
 Source: See the text.
 was a name associated with two individuals (father and son). Louis Gros
 senior had a migratory bent. Between 1757 and 1765 he was a baker in
 Nuits. Then he moved to the nearby village of Chaux to be a merchant
 until 1773, whereupon he returned to Nuits. At about that time, his son
 appeared as a merchant in Nuits. In this particularly perverse example,
 if we assumed that all contracts with the same name belonged to the
 same person we would perceive only one Louis Gros. Requiring that
 occupation and name match would yield us three Louis Gros. A
 procedure demanding that name, occupation, and residence all agree
 would saddle us with four different Louis Gros. If, however, one
 grouped together contracts where name and residence were identical,
 one would get the appropriate number of individuals-two. These
 matches, however, would be inappropriate, because they would split
 the father's activity in two and lump his contracts from Nuits with those
 of his son. Although this example is extreme, the economic world of
 Nuits was one of great mobility, especially in agriculture where the
 boundaries between plowman, vintner, farmhand, and laborer were
 fuzzy and not infrequently crossed, if one is to trust the tax rolles.
 Although using tax rolles to identify individuals would be preferable, we
 can in the short run rely on evidence internal to the credit records to get
 a reasonable idea about participation. Table 3 presents the evidence
 about participation with varying definitions of identity.
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 Although the first method of identification in the table certainly leads
 to too few debtors and creditors and the last to too many, all provide
 qualitatively the same result: with 16,000 potential parties to 8,000
 contracts, we have more than 5,000 and probably less than 7,000 actual
 parties. This may be a wide range, but the conclusion that participation
 was very broad is difficult to escape because the number of participants
 is close to the number of families. Even assuming an untenably high 100
 percent turnover in households still leads to a participation rate of no
 less than 50 percent. To be sure, one should reduce the totals by the
 number of nonlocal participants, but these made up only 7 percent of
 creditors and debtors.
 Although participation was widespread both for lenders and borrow-
 ers, Nuits St. Georges was not simply a bilateral credit system. As Table
 3, panel B makes clear, lending was already highly concentrated,
 especially if one takes into account the fact that the individuals who
 both borrowed and lent were mostly lenders. The 17 individuals who
 each participated in more than 50 contracts were creditors in about
 1,800 contracts. Of these big lenders, ten borrowed enough times to
 satisfy the definition of an intermediary directly. Of the seven big
 lenders who never appear in the record as borrowers, two were wealthy
 local seigniors who were also royal officers in Dijon or Paris and could
 therefore borrow large sums outside of Nuits. The importance of these
 individuals is even greater than it appears because most big lenders
 either began or stopped their activity within the period.
 The rise of intermediaries with significant market shares in Nuits
 stands in stark contrast to the greater bilateralism of other French credit
 markets like L'Isle sur Sorgues or Paris.'9 The divergent evolution of
 credit systems in different parts of France may stem in part from
 regional differences in credit demand, but it seems that a more funda-
 mental force was at work. Paris and l'Isle were markets that served
 individuals with nonmovable assets. In l'Isle these assets were land,
 whereas in Paris they were real estate, government offices, and bonds.
 In both markets creditors could seize and sell a bad debtor's property,
 and as a result lenders may have been less concerned with establishing
 the details of an individual's credit rating.20 In Nuits, the farmers who
 made up the vast majority of the borrowers held little or no land; thus
 their debts were poorly collateralized. The absence of good collateral
 made understanding a potential borrower's current economic situation
 and level of indebtedness essential. Thus informational requirements
 were greater in Burgundy than in the areas previously investigated.
 19 In a given year, no lender ever made more than 10 percent of the loans-except Lacoste, who
 was creditor in 18 percent of all contracts in 1766 and 24 percent in 1767. For Paris, see Hoffman
 et al., "Credit Markets" and "What Do Notaries Do?"
 20 High legal costs ensured that it was rare that lenders recovered much from seized assets but
 borrowers usually lost all their collateral.
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 Economies of scale in information gathering ensured that Nuits's
 financial market would be more concentrated than the others.
 Because communicating reliable information about creditworthiness
 is difficult, one might assume that individual borrowers would be very
 loyal to individual lenders.2' Indeed, repeat transactions would allow
 borrowers to economize on information transmission costs. Of the more
 than 830 repeat borrowers, less than 40 percent borrowed more than
 once from the same individual. Examining loans provides a similar
 answer-there were 675 loans involving repeat dealings, whereas mul-
 tiple borrowers totaled nearly 3,000 loans and multiple lenders some
 5,000. Most repeat dealings featured big lenders, but these contracts
 only formed a limited part of those lenders' total business. Indeed,
 repeat transactions formed less than 16 percent of the big lenders'
 business. Repeated interaction would have saved on information costs,
 but it also required that a lender's savings pattern match his borrower's
 demand for funds. Rather than repeat interaction, the evidence suggests
 that informational problems were overcome by intermediaries-nota-
 ries and merchants. If these intermediaries determined that the bor-
 rower was worthy of a loan, they either made the loan or referred the
 borrower to another source of credit.
 Between 1756 and 1776 the credit market in Nuits was largely run by
 seven notaries, eight merchants and the agents of the local seigniors and
 abbeys. Like most people in preindustrial Europe, these men were not
 fully specialized; seigniorial agents managed rental properties; mer-
 chants sold goods and livestock; and notaries wrote up at least five
 noncredit contracts for every loan. Yet these few people seem to have
 collected information about debtors efficiently enough that the credit
 system was able to distribute loans broadly and, as we shall see, to
 dampen the various crises that affected the region.
 THE RHYTHMS OF CREDIT ACTIVITY
 Rural credit markets have shown great variability over time, but little
 has been done to examine the determinants of this variation outside of
 periods of dramatic political change. The two decades between 1756 and
 1776 offer the opportunity to study the variation in credit activity in a
 period of relative political stability. Capturing the full extent of the
 credit market's response to variations in the economic and social
 environment would require a fuller data set than the one at hand, which
 lacks detailed information on interest rates, duration of loans, or
 collateral. Nonetheless, by examining both the movements of aggregate
 credit and those of some of its subcomponents one can learn much about
 what drove credit activity. The strongest rhythm in Nuits's financial
 21 Given the dispersed settlement pattern, potential lenders were unlikely to have much
 information about potential borrowers unless they relied on an intermediary.
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 TABLE 4
 CREDIT SEASONALITY
 Notes Obligations Rentes Cessions Loans
 Total to
 Quarter Loans Amounts Loans Amounts Loans Amounts Loans Amounts Volume Farmers
 I 720 141 1,413 121 186 518 99 488 416,000 1,341
 II 710 130 1,505 113 137 500 101 523 385,000 1,423
 III 512 178 791 129 108 569 82 776 318,000 703
 IV 552 162 836 133 141 486 90 411 306,000 816
 Source: See the text.
 market was seasonal: from peak to trough credit activity fell by 50
 percent. As Table 4 shows, obligations were the most seasonal of all
 loan types, followed closely by notes. Although rentes display a similar
 pattern, it is less marked-not surprising, because the brokering of
 long-term mortgage loans is a complex affair in which precise timing is
 less important than for short-term loans. Finally, cessions show little
 seasonality, which is consistent with the notion that financial agree-
 ments in these markets were of limited liquidity. It appears that
 creditors in need of cash were more likely to borrow than to resell an
 outstanding loan.
 The severe seasonality of the credit market was driven by the number
 of credit contracts signed in a given season rather than by the size of
 loans, which displayed a slight countercyclical behavior. The early peak
 of credit activity is no statistical fluke, for the first semester of the year
 was always the most active, and financial activity was greatest in either
 the first or the second quarter in 19 out of 20 years. This seasonality was
 produced because those involved in the region's dominant economic
 activity-agriculture-favored the first half of the year (see Table 4, last
 column). Farmers were the dominant borrowing group, so they im-
 parted this seasonality to all the lending groups. Although the lending
 behavior of farmers also peaked early in the year, it did not come close
 to matching the increase in agricultural borrowing. The high seasonality
 was thus possible because other groups whose credit demands were
 little correlated with those of farmers were willing to lend to them when
 they needed funds. The large farming sector explains the seasonal
 demand for credit, but what allowed the credit market to fill that demand
 was the substantial size of the trade and crafts sectors.
 To account for the annual variation in credit activity we have a limited
 number of explanatory variables: birth, marriage, and death totals for
 Nuits and a small number of adjoining parishes; wine and wheat prices;
 the timing of wars and government defaults; and credit activity in Paris.
 Wine and grain harvests occur only once a year, so we have in effect
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 TABLE 5
 REGRESSION OF ESTIMATES OF CREDIT ACTIVITY
 Total Total Notes Notes Obligations Obligations Rentes Rentes
 Constant 51,775 68,285 25,363 22,063 11,789 23,162 18,484 11,325
 (20,176) (13,794) (8,526) (5,930) (12,978) (9,296) (8,533) (7,483)
 Marriages -406 -451 -302 -274 -172 -219 18 81
 (312) (297) (132) (127) (193) (201) (153) (162)
 Wheat price 504 -43 403 -85
 (268) (113) (177) (100)
 Wine price 223 1.5 217 11
 (138) (59.2) (91) (67)
 R 2 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.46 0.43 0.12 0.07
 R2 0.32 0.32 0.22 0.22 0.40 0.36 0.02 -0.02
 Rho 0.17 0.28 0.16 0.24 0.27 0.13 -0.28 -0.24
 Notes: All variables are in livres. Standard errors appear in parentheses. The regressions reported
 are corrected for first order serial correlation.
 Source: See the text.
 only 20 observations.22 For this reason, I employed a simple statistical
 approach: linear regressions corrected for first order autocorrelation.
 Aggregate credit activity for each year can be broken down by type of
 contract, geographical origin, and occupation of borrower or lender,
 resulting in more than 100 potential independent variables, all of which
 could vary differently. To make the analysis manageable, a somewhat
 arbitrary set of restrictions was imposed. First, only the contempora-
 neous effects of independent variables are reported.23 Second, I limit
 the disaggregated investigation to two series-total volume of credit or
 obligations broken down either by occupation or residence.
 During the 20 years under study the area around Nuits experienced
 substantial demographic variation (the coefficient of variation of each
 demographic series is nearly 30 percent). This variation offers an
 opportunity to evaluate the relationship between credit activity and
 births, deaths, and marriages. The demographic history of preindustrial
 societies remains heavily influenced by Malthus and tends to emphasize
 the importance of income constraints on family planning. Most of these
 analyses assume that demographic decisions like births and marriage
 were strictly financed out of current income. The evidence I have
 presented on the broad distribution of credit suggests that families were
 not so constrained, but it remains to be seen empirically whether their
 choices to use credit markets were determined by demographic factors.
 As Table 5 reports, demographic variables played a limited role in
 determining credit activity. Neither births nor deaths had any clear
 22 Since wine and grape prices covaried closely, I only include one of these in any regression to
 avoid problems of multicolinearity.
 23 To be sure, for those variables that were eliminated as irrelevant, leads and lags were also
 attempted with no success. As for the variables that are discussed at length, the contemporaneous
 effect most often dominates those of lagged values.
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 impact on any series, so I did not report the regressions that included
 those variables. The irrelevance of births is not altogether surprising
 because most couples had many more children than the number of loans
 they may have contracted. Death is a more complex issue. The death
 series is the weakest of the three, because for Nuits itself only adult
 deaths have been tabulated.24 In theory, adult deaths should have had a
 different impact on credit activity than child deaths, because the death
 of an adult could have occasioned the breakup of a family, which would
 have had far more financial consequences than the demise of a young-
 ster. Unfortunately, the role of death in credit activity cannot be fully
 resolved with the data at hand.
 Unlike births and deaths, marriages generally have a negative impact
 on credit activity. This correlation could stem from one of two factors.
 First, marriage rates could be an indirect indication of the general
 economic situation. As previously shown by David Weir, people in
 France married in good times. Indeed, periods of low grain prices
 corresponded to significantly higher marriage rates.25 Second, mar-
 riages could have a direct effect on credit if families financed weddings
 by turning their credit activity inward, either by hoarding their savings
 or by keeping money reimbursed by debtors rather than lending it out
 again. This would reduce the external-and observable-supply of
 credit. This view is supported by evidence drawn from the breakdown
 of contracts by type, in which the only positive coefficients for mar-
 riages come from rentes volumes that were by definition dynastic
 contracts.
 The present analysis, then, indicates that marriage is the only
 demographic variable that had a consistent (negative) effect on credit
 activity. However, more refined data than those under examination
 would be required to test the specific causal connections between
 marriage and credit activity, as well as the possible effects of births and
 deaths, which reveal no determining effects on credit activity within the
 limits of the present data.26
 The analysis of the effect of prices must begin with a consideration of
 elasticities of demand. Because the demand for wheat was inelastic,
 whereas that for wine was elastic, one might assume that income in
 Nuits was high in periods of elevated grain prices and low in periods of
 high wine prices. Yet years of high grain prices were also years of
 relative harvest failures, when many farmers experienced temporary
 revenue shortfalls. Years of high wine prices, on the other hand, were
 years of good-quality wine when revenues may have been correspond-
 24 The demographic data were originally collected by genealogists who cared little about infant
 mortality. The appropriate corrections are currently being carried out.
 25 Weir, "Life. "
 26 On marriages, compare my later discussion of plowmen and winegrowers.
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 TABLE 6
 REGRESSIONS ON VOLUMES DISAGGREGATED BY OCCUPATION
 Lenders Borrowers
 Agriculture Crafts Trade Agriculture Crafts Trade
 Constant 6,370 5,183 2,523 268 16,746 20,254 1,043 1,768
 (3,117) (1,911) (1,868) (5,045) (8,140) (5,495) (1,406) (2,093)
 Marriages -59 -47 -8.9 23 -186 -197 -40 -16
 (46) (41) (27) (76) (118) (118) (30) (45)
 Wheat Price 26 -10 166 166 41 46
 (42) (25) (68) (68) (12) (20)
 Wine Price 41 79
 (19) (54)
 R2 .31 .44 .13 .33 .44 .43 .43 .28
 R2 .23 .37 .03 .25 .38 .37 .37 .22
 Rho .28 .23 .31 .22 .31 .25 -.23 .14
 N 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
 Notes: All variables are in livres. Standard errors appear in parentheses. The regressions reported
 are corrected for first order serial correlation.
 Source: See the text.
 ingly high, reducing incentives to borrow.27 The statistical evidence,
 nonetheless, is unambiguous: prices mattered to financial markets, and
 wheat prices mattered more than those for wine. With nearly equivalent
 means (wheat 53 sous and wine 51 sous), the coefficients for wheat are
 twice as large as those for wine, implying that the elasticity of credit
 with respect to grain prices was double that for wine.28
 The regressions lump all borrowers and lenders together, despite the
 fact that farmers and urban workers probably had rather different
 reactions to changes in prices. Table 6 provides the results of the same
 regressions at a more disaggregated level. For the sake of brevity, I have
 displayed only those regressions relevant to the argument. To avoid
 sample selection problems, I concentrate on obligation totals. Generally
 the results are consistent with the aggregate analysis. The coefficients,
 however, have the same sign for lending and borrowing so that a
 variable that increases a social category's propensity to borrow also
 increases its propensity to lend. These variables therefore are more
 likely to be indicators of the variance of earnings within a social
 category than of its mean. If the earnings of all individuals in a group go
 up by 1 percent and that group's borrowing decreases, its lending should
 not fall. Yet we observe the opposite, which suggests that the best way
 to elucidate what forces drove the credit market is an investigation that
 27 Unfortunately, neither Saint-Jacob nor Lavalle from whose work prices are drawn make it
 clear whether the prices were computed for harvest years or for calendar years. Previous research
 has shown that these details have a statistically important impact. See Rosenthal, "Revolution."
 28 Table 6 also shows that both notes and rentes were mainly driven by factors other than prices.
 For notes in particular the suspicion is that the decision to register a note created serious sample
 selection bias.
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 focuses on individuals rather than groups. Nonetheless, the aggregate
 price analysis confirms that credit markets in preindustrial France
 reduced the impact of short-term scarcity by allowing individuals to
 move resources across time.
 The occupational breakdowns can be carried further within agricul-
 ture to isolate the credit volumes of plowmen and winegrowers.
 Because plowmen were principally grain farmers, one would expect that
 wine prices would be much less important to them than wheat prices.
 This turns out to be the case, as well as the converse: winegrowers were
 not as sensitive to grain prices as they were to wine prices. Further,
 plowmen's borrowing does not respond to our marriage indicator.
 Marriage totals contain no data for the plain villages where plowmen
 dominate. Winegrowers, however, have the familiar negative correla-
 tion between credit activity and marriages. Because the overall eco-
 nomic conditions of the area were probably highly correlated from grain
 to winegrowing, these findings further reinforce the notion that mar-
 riages acted directly upon credit.
 If nature's shocks seem to have had a limited but clear impact on the
 credit system, those inflicted by royal policy prove more difficult to
 trace. With one exception, dummy variables for war (1757 to 1763) or
 periods of government default (1759, 1770, or 1766 to 1770) had no
 impact on financial activity in Nuits at any level of aggregation.29 The
 one exception involves distant participants, who increased their note
 lending and decreased their obligation lending during a period of default.
 The increase in their note lending was very large (the dummy variable is
 half the mean of the dependent variable), whereas the decrease in their
 obligation contracting was a good deal smaller. The note activity
 increase is probably attributable to increased registration. Government
 defaults drove intermediaries like Lacoste out of business or at least
 made it difficult for such men to meet their creditors' demands. They in
 turn registered their temporarily or permanently unpaid notes. Thus the
 observed increase in activity may merely be a reflection of the increase
 in registration. The decline in obligation lending, however, is not
 spurious but rather a sign that whenever political instability increased,
 credit markets closed in on themselves.
 The effect of financial crisis on the region was also dampened by
 Nuits's limited reliance on interregional capital flows. Merchants were
 at the center of the regional credit market, and as the story of Lacoste
 and the increased registration by distant note holders suggests, this
 market faltered in 1770. Notarial credit, however, continued virtually
 unscathed. Even rente volumes-a type of loan for which the govern-
 ment reduced the legal interest rate from 5 to 4 percent between 1766
 and 1770-failed to register a decline. Of course, this isolation came at
 29 These regressions were not reported for lack of space.
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 FIGURE I
 CREDIT ACTIVITY IN NUITS AND PARIS, 1757-1776
 (Nuits in thousands of livres, Paris in millions of livres)
 Source: See the text.
 a cost for it meant that capital transfer from region to region could not
 offset nature's shocks to local agriculture.
 The experience of Nuits contrasts strikingly with that of the only
 credit market for which comparable information is available, Paris.30 In
 Paris economic and demographic variables had no bearing on credit
 activity, whereas government intervention mattered a good deal more.
 Figure 1 shows that whereas war and default affected credit markets in
 Paris, they did not in Nuits. For instance, in Paris war brought on a
 decline in credit activity that picked up again after the peace of 1763. In
 Nuits the reverse occurred, and credit actually dropped after the war
 ended. The imposition of the 4 percent interest rate cap early in 1766
 brought stagnation to Parisian notarial finance, whereas after the return
 to 5 percent in 1770, rentes contracting was greatly stimulated. The
 events of 1766 had no impact on rente contracting in Nuits, and the
 return to stability in 1770 ushered in a prolonged decline in rentes.
 30 See Hoffman et al., "Economie."
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 Given this evidence, it is tempting to conclude that credit markets
 were poorly integrated in eighteenth-century France. As in most prein-
 dustrial capital markets, adjustments depended on specific individuals
 rather than on anonymous market forces. These individuals were
 mostly merchants; because their activities were easily disrupted by the
 state, their networks remained fragile. Notaries ran credit systems that
 were local in nature and remained shielded from most government
 intervention. Thus merchants and notaries carried out complimentary
 activities. Given the demand for interregional capital flows and the very
 real threats of government intervention, it is not surprising that the
 local, bilateral markets of notaries and the regional ones of merchants
 did not merge.
 To surmount harvest failures, epidemics, wars, and other crises that
 pervaded rural areas in preindustrial Europe, credit systems had to be
 resilient rather than narrowly efficient. Information technology and the
 costs of recovering debts at a distance made these markets primarily
 local. To be sure, a system of commercial credit thrived alongside the
 local credit market, and this system has received the most attention
 from scholars of financial history. Yet the differences in average
 duration between notes, rentes, and obligations imply that the financial
 stock was overwhelmingly notarial credit.
 CONCLUSION
 Credit markets in Nuits Saint-Georges distributed funds quite broadly
 in the population. Individuals could borrow and lend using a variety of
 instruments including long-term debt collateralized by land (rentes).
 However, because most farmers owned little land to use as collateral,
 the bulk of the activity was in short- and medium-term debt. To reduce
 the high transactions costs of short-term debt, the market was interme-
 diated by merchants and notaries. Quantitative analysis of credit
 activity suggests that individuals used these markets to invest their
 savings and that they withdrew their funds when they needed to provide
 for their children. Individuals also regularly turned to credit markets to
 deal with adversity. The limited scope of interregional capital markets,
 however, forced individuals to borrow within the local community.
 Thus credit markets could offer only a partial solution to crises in
 output. The sheer variety of ways in which rural credit markets affected
 the lives of individuals in preindustrial France argues that they were
 simply too important to the local economy to ignore any longer.
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